Global Shield Newsletter (27 September 2023)
An integrated view to environmental risk, the national security implications of emerging technology, and the impact of science on biological research policy
This twice-monthly newsletter highlights the latest policy, research and news on global catastrophic risk (GCR).
Taking an integrated view to environmental and climate risk
An update to the planetary boundaries framework finds that “six of the nine boundaries are transgressed, suggesting that Earth is now well outside of the safe operating space for humanity,” according to a new paper in Science Advances. Earth system scientists have developed this framework based on nine processes that are critical for maintaining the stability and resilience of Earth’s environmental systems. Climate change, biosphere integrity, land system change, freshwater change, biogeochemical flows and novel entities (such as synthetic chemicals and substances) are outside their healthy boundaries. Ocean acidification is approaching its boundary.
Leaders from around 140 countries gathered for the UN General Assembly. Climate change was a running theme through the leaders’ speeches. UN Secretary General António Guterres claimed that “humanity has opened the gates to hell.”
Policy comment: While climate change remains a heavy focus for environmental advocates and policymakers, broader environmental damage is bringing critical Earth systems to the brink of collapse. Deforestation, resource extraction, urbanization and pollution, among other factors, is causing biodiversity loss and changes in land, water and air ecologies that could lead to GCR in its own right. For example, there is little understanding, let alone policy, of the impact of the hundreds of thousands of synthetic chemicals that are produced and released to the environment.
Treating climate change as a separate and priority issue neglects these other interconnected environmental hazards. A more integrated view would consider climate change as one, albeit significant, component of environmental risk.
Policymakers must address these issues, but in order to do so effectively, they first need a better understanding of the different Earth systems that are vulnerable, how they relate, which ones receive little focus, and what policy options are required. For example, the planetary boundaries framework suggests that global forest cover is “one of the most powerful means that humanity has at its disposal to combat climate change.” These most recent findings highlight the need for the development of an advanced planetary boundaries model that can more consistently and comprehensively collect data, track changes, enable analysis and simulations, and support policy advice.
See also
National security journalist and author, Spencer Ackerman, argues that climate change should be more central in US foreign policy: “Averting mass death and even civilizational collapse ought to be the central organizing principle of US grand strategy.”
Tackling the national security implications of emerging technology
Policymakers in the US are increasingly focused on the national security implications of emerging technology, in particular the potentially catastrophic threats. On 19 September, a subcommittee of the Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental affairs held a hearing on the threats to national security from advanced technology, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence committee held a hearing on the national security implications of AI.
Separately, two RAND analysts note that “policymakers consistently face the challenge of rapid technological advancements and their associated threats, outpacing the creation of relevant policies and countermeasures.” They argue that, although transformative technologies pose risks, they also can help with countermeasures to those risks.
Policy comment: Emerging technology - particularly AI and biotechnology - and their integration into nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, the information ecosystem and autonomous systems, pose a national security challenge and a global catastrophic risk. National security communities could play a critical role in understanding, assessing, warning, planning and responding to catastrophic threats posed by emerging technologies.
However, national security communities need more policy guidance, technical capabilities and workforce to play this role. Catastrophic risk from emerging technology should be instilled within national security and defense strategies so that it receives the adequate prioritization and resourcing.
National security risk assessments should be updated immediately, including specific risk profiles for AI-enabled engineered pathogens, cyber weapons and autonomous weapons, as well as on the nexus of AI and nuclear command and control. Arms of intelligence and defense agencies focused on science and technology should devote resources to researching and developing risk-reducing technologies - such as nuclear verification, AI security and safety, cyber resilience, pathogen detection and vaccine development - which will require significant effort and world-class expertise.
Agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) or national labs are uniquely placed to seek out, fund and develop technologies that reduce risk. Domestic security agencies should place greater effort toward identifying individuals and groups that intend to access and use advanced dangerous technologies because the capability is so quickly democratizing.
The US government is also undertaking an all-hazards assessment of global catastrophic and existential risk following the passage of the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act last year. How these concerns on emerging technologies are included in that assessment will indicate how the US and other allied nations will approach the reduction of that risk in the future.
See also:
Interview with Jason Matheny, president of the RAND Corporation, on the technological advances in nuclear weapons, biological weapons and AI outpacing policy
Impacting biological research policy through science
According to a new report by the Pandemic Center at the Brown University School of Public Health, many African countries have policies to address naturally occurring outbreaks, but they lack the tools to identify and manage incidents caused by accidental or deliberate pathogen releases. The report emphasizes the importance of multi-hazard consequence management strategies for improving preparedness to this risk.
Meanwhile, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has ended a $125m wildlife virus hunting program, according to a new report in the BMJ. The program, – “Discovery & Exploration of Emerging Pathogens - Viral Zoonoses” or (DEEP VZN) – intended to collect around 480,000 samples from wildlife to seek out unknown zoonotic diseases with significant pandemic potential. The decision came after significant private and bipartisan pressure, including from senior White House officials, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and Massachusetts Institute of Technology biotechnologist Kevin Esvelt.
Policy comment: Scientists and science organizations can play a role in shaping policy, particularly on the risk from emerging technologies. Legislative and executive branch discussions and decisions on the risk of biotechnology were enabled by timely and quality scientific advice. The key challenge for scientists is to communicate their research clearly for policy audiences, and finding the right timing and opportunity to showcase their work.
In this case, House and Senate committees on COVID-19 and related issues provided a platform for pandemic and biosecurity experts to present their expertise. It also demonstrates the need to engage with multiple policy stakeholders. For this one issue, committees covering health, energy and foreign affairs, among others, as well as the White House, State Department, Pentagon and Government Accountability Office, all played a role.
However, the DEEP VZN program was unique in that the risk was clear, it could be clearly articulated, and it related to actions the government was already embarking on. Scientific advice is needed, and much more difficult to provide, when there is an absence of an existing government policy. Experts and scientists focused on GCR should be ready with practical and specific policy proposals where new policy needs to be developed.
See also
Vox article on the dangers of virus hunting
A Bulletin article on regulating gain-of-function research
Considerable controversy remains over whether COVID-19 originated from a lab accident, but the risk of future accidents is concerning given the long history of such incidents in the past.
Thanks Rumtin very thoughtful. Good to hear about the Global Catastrophic Risk Act in the US